ABSTRACT-Natural selection constantly removes those genetic variants (alleles) that even slightly decrease average reproductive success. Yet, given the high heritabilities and prevalence rates of severe mental disorders, human populations seem to be awash in deleterious alleles. Evolutionary genetics offers an illuminating framework for understanding why mental disorder risk alleles have persisted despite natural selection, and this framework can help guide future research in behavioral and psychiatric genetics.
Despite the praise heaped upon the human design by theologians, philosophers, and evolutionists over the years, several aspects of it appear decidedly suboptimal. Humans suffer from myriad seeming design flaws, from fever and vomiting to nearsightedness and back pain to Alzheimer's and heart disease. The last 30 years has seen an awakening in our scientific understanding of these diseases and susceptibilities-not just in terms of their proximate medical causes but also in the deeper sense of why they have evolved despite-or because of-natural selection.
Darwinian medicine has made it clear that many such diseases and susceptibilities are best understood in the context of evolutionary adaptations (Nesse & Williams, 1994) . Unpleasant as they may be, fever, nausea, diarrhea, and coughing are bodily defenses crafted by natural selection to deal with infections and toxins (though these symptoms may sometimes be co-opted by pathogens for their own selfish ends). Nearsightedness, obesity, and heart disease probably reflect mismatches between the environments our bodies evolved to deal with and modern ones that pose novel challenges. Age-related diseases such as Alzheimer's likely reflect the fact that genes with ''antagonistic'' effects that benefit the young at a cost to the old tend to spread throughout the population, making anyone, should they live long enough, susceptible to diseases of old age.
However, certain human maladies do not fit so easily into the adaptive framework provided by Darwinian medicine. Perhaps this is best exemplified by the most severe mental disorders (see Table 1 ), which seem to be neither defenses, mismatches, nor age-related trade-offs. Unlike diseases that reflect age-related trade-offs, the mental disorders in Table 1 tend to strike in childhood to the early 30s, periods that precede or are coterminous with best estimates of when ancestral humans were reproducing. Nor do the mental disorders in Table 1 fit the profiles of diseases primarily caused by mismatches between ancestral and modern environments. Diseases caused by such mismatches tend to be highly variable across time and between cultures and should be virtually absent in traditional societies lacking the novel (moderating) environmental factors. While data on mental disorder rates in the few remaining traditional societies are lacking and much needed, what evidence we do have implies that the rates of mental disorders in Table 1 (with the probable exception of autism) are paradoxically high the world over, from the United States to Palau, China to Botswana, and India to Argentina (e.g., for schizophrenia, see Saha, Chant, Welham, & McGrath, 2005) .
Finally, the mental disorders listed in Table 1 share little similarity to known defenses, such as fever and nausea, which are reliably triggered by environmental threats and which subside when threats have passed. It is possible that certain reactions, the extreme forms of which are deemed mental disorders, represent adaptive defenses. For example, Keller and Nesse (2006) hypothesized that normal depressive reactions-the types that most people experience following deaths, failures, and so forth-serve specific adaptive functions in the situations that arouse them, much as other unpleasant defenses such as normal fever or pain serve situation-specific functions. Persistent depressive reactions (clinical depression) may represent either extreme/intractable situations (perhaps more common in modern environments) or dysregulated neurological systems (which may have strong genetic underpinnings, requiring an evolutionary explanation for why such genes exist; see below). However, the mental disorders in Table 1 are not reliably triggered by environmental factors, and they tend to persist, often for life, rather than to subside. Moreover, whereas virtually everyone has the capacity to have a fever or feel sad given the ''right''situation, it is very unlikely that more than a small minority of people have the capacity to develop autism or schizophrenia, for example, no matter what their circumstances.
In short, the adaptive explanations that elucidate many other seeming human design flaws fail when it comes to severe mental disorders. At its core, this is because traditional Darwinian medicine explanations explain universal adaptive capacities, not heritable differences in risk.
THE EVOLUTIONARY PARADOX OF SEVERE MENTAL DISORDERS
One of the most robust findings in modern psychiatric research has been that common, severe mental disorders are moderately to highly heritable ( Table 1 ), meaning that differences in genetic variants (alleles) between people cause differences in risk. From an evolutionary perspective, this heritability and commonality poses a paradox. Natural selection constantly removes from the population alleles that tend to decrease, even imperceptibly, their carriers' fitness (expected number of surviving offspring). Therefore, one might expect heritable disorders either to be rare or else not truly harmful to fitness. Yet severe mental disorders are puzzlingly common from an evolutionary perspective, being hundreds and even thousands of times more prevalent than the 2,000 or so single-locus diseases known to harm fitness (Table 1) . Severe mental disorders have a cumulative prevalence of some 6% in the United States (Kessler, Chiu, Demler, & Walters, 2005) , and nearly 50% of people meet criteria for a less severe mental disorder such as depression during their lifetimes (Kessler et al., 2005) . Moreover, mental disorders account for nearly two thirds of the total disease burden among reproductively aged persons, and almost every investigation on the topic has found that the severest of them are associated with profound social impairments and reductions in reproductive success (Table 1) . Why were the alleles that predispose to severe mental disorders (hereafter, risk alleles) not purged long ago by natural selection? If, over all the environments and all the genomes an allele finds itself in, it has an even slightly negative or positive effect, it will either go extinct or reach fixation, respectivelyand will confer no heritability to traits. This happens surprisingly rapidly, within tens to hundreds of generations for even small positive or negative fitness effects. So the paradox boils down to this: Why do seemingly detrimental (but the paradox is every bit as salient if they are beneficial) risk alleles hang around at intermediate frequencies, where they confer heritability to mental disorders? Some simple resolutions to this paradox-that ancestral humans reproduced earlier than modern ones do, that risk alleles are strongly epistatic (moderated by other alleles) and hidden from selection, that mental disorders were benign ancestrally-do not hold up well to theoretical and empirical scrutiny (reviewed in Keller & Miller, 2006) . Three mechanisms better grounded in modern evolutionary genetics-each of which leaves different, albeit messy, signatures in the genomeare reviewed below.
POTENTIAL RESOLUTIONS TO THE PARADOX

Mutation-Selection
Mutations are copying errors that occur during DNA replication. These can be substitutions of a single base pair (point mutations) or deletions, duplications, inversions, or translocations of many base pairs in a row. Of evolutionary relevance are those mutations that occur when sperm or egg cells are created. These mutations can be passed on to fertilized ova. If so, they will be copied into every cell in the offspring's body, including the offspring's own sperm or egg cells and thus potentially transferred to any descendant thereafter. This is how new mutations are ''introduced'' into a population. Very rarely, through blind luck, new mutations happen to increase their carriers' average reproductive success, and over time can spread through a population, forming the genetic basis of new, universal adaptations. Almost always, however, mutations that affect organic machinery degrade rather than improve its tightly coordinated performance. Mutation-selection models describe the equilibrium between new mutations being introduced into the population and their removal, usually many generations later, by natural selection. Across individuals at a given time, a gene harbors one or a few functionally equivalent ''normal'' allele(s) at a very high frequency and many different rare, deleterious mutations. While each individual deleterious mutation is destined for eventual extinction, new ones are constantly arising, creating an equilibrium in the population between normal alleles (which most people have at a given gene) and rare, deleterious mutations (which a tiny minority of people have at that gene). These mutations create maladaptive noise-and heritability-in traits.
After years of being discounted as a major force, many evolutionary geneticists now consider mutation selection to be the principal factor explaining the heritability of complex traits (Houle, 1998) . The key insight was to realize that although mutations are rare per gene, hundreds or even many thousands of genes can influence complex traits, and so the cumulative number of mutations affecting such traits could be high enough to explain their heritability. This insight has, in turn, been used as a basis for resolving the paradox of common, heritable mental disorders (Gangestad & Yeo, 1997; Keller & Miller, 2006; McClellan, Susser, & King, 2007) .
Supporting this view are findings indicating that the number of genes harboring deleterious mutations is quite large: Proper cellular functioning is disrupted by the action of some 500 old, slightly deleterious mutations passed down from great, great . . . grandparents (Fay, Wyckoff, & Wu, 2001 ) as well as one or two new deleterious mutations that arose for the first time in the parent's egg or sperm cells (Eyre-Walker & Keightley, 1999) . Of course, these are just averages; some people inherit many more mutations than average and some many fewer, and mutations vary enormously in their effect sizes, creating individual differences in the degree to which organs (including the brain) are disrupted by them. The phenotypic effects of these mutations range from the drastic and tell-tale, causing the single-gene disorders so successfully mapped by geneticists, to individually small, unnoticeable ones, which tend to be more common because they are removed more slowly by selection.
The variation in the cumulative effect of mutations might serve as an important substrate to the heritability of mental disorders. By this view, mutations that degrade the brain's performance differentiate everyone on a panoply of behavioral dimensions, making some people slow at learning, others bad at remembering, others too anxious or not anxious enough, and so forth. But some people inherit an especially high ''load'' of mutations (from hundreds of small-effect ones to a single large-effect one) that disrupt particular neurodevelopmental pathways, increasing the risk of aberrant behaviors and psychiatric categorization. According to mutational models, mental disorders are not ''natural kinds'' with clear boundaries and common causes, but rather are umbrella concepts covering a heterogeneous group of similar-appearing phenotypes.
The empirical evidence that mutations play at least some role in the etiology of severe mental disorders is compelling (Table 2) . Also telling is what has not been found. Despite 20 years of gene hunting, scientists have not found clear links between specific alleles and severe mental disorders, which might suggest that many different risk alleles exist, no one of which accounts for much population risk-exactly what would be predicted from a mutational model. However, methods to find risk alleles to date have been less than optimal. The next 5 years, when results from a large number of whole-genome association studies will be released, will clarify whether many different, individually rare alleles (consistent with mutation-selection balance) or a handful of individually common alleles (consistent with either of the evolutionary processes reviewed next) are the most important in explaining the heritability of mental disorders.
Evolutionary Time Lags
Mutation-selection is unlikely to be the sole explanation for the heritability of severe mental disorders, nor is it inconsistent with other processes. One class of explanation that may be particularly important is evolutionary time lags. When environments change quickly, as many aspects of human environments have, there can be mismatches such that ancestral alleles are poorly adapted to current environments. Given the increasing awareness that allelic effects can depend on the environmental context (Moffitt, Caspi, & Rutter, 2005) , alleles that were once neutral or adaptive may be today's risk alleles.
The ancestral-susceptibility model (Di Rienzo & Hudson, 2005) proposes that many current risk alleles are ancestral and are being driven to extinction due to rapid changes in human environments. Consistent with this, rates of allelic substitution (reflecting natural selection) are over 100 times higher in the last 10,000 years than they were during most of human evolution (Hawks, Wang, Cochran, Harpending, & Moyzis, 2007) . Several risk alleles for common diseases, such as Alzheimer's and hypertension, are ancestral (Di Rienzo & Hudson, 2005) , and Lo et al. (2007) found that schizophrenia risk alleles in the GABA-A receptor b2 gene have been under recent negative selection.
Another type of time-lag explanation involves the coevolution between pathogens and their hosts (Gangestad & Yeo, 1997) . Pathogens rapidly evolve new adaptations to better thrive in human bodies. This causes many different defense alleles-some better than others-to exist in the population at a given time.
Volume 17-Number 6 Pathogens, which can affect neurodevelopment, are known risk factors for several mental disorders. For example, several studies have found that childhood Streptococcal infections are weakly associated with adult obsessive-compulsive disorder (Kim et al., 2004) . If resistance to Streptococcal infections is heritable, then part of the heritability of obsessive-compulsive disorder could be due to Streptococcal-human coevolution. This example illustrates that the risk alleles responsible for the heritability of mental disorders need not directly increase mental-disorder risk. Rather, they may make one vulnerable to factors such as pathogens that do increase risk.
Balancing Selection
Balancing selection occurs when natural selection actively maintains two or more equally fit alleles at a gene. This usually occurs because the fitness of the alleles increases as they become rarer: If one allele drifts to a lower frequency than its equilibrium value, its fitness increases, which then nudges its frequency back toward the equilibrium. Heterozygote advantage-in which individuals who are heterozygote (Aa) at a gene have higher fitness than those with either homozygote (AA or aa)-is a special case of this process. For example, individuals in equatorial Africa who are heterozygous at the b-hemoglobin locus are protected against malaria, whereas homozygous individuals are either vulnerable to malaria or at risk of sickle-cell anemia. Each allele-as well as sickle-cell anemia-is maintained in equatorial Africa because if one allele becomes infrequent by chance, it more often finds itself paired with the opposite allele, increasing its fitness and frequency.
Although balancing selection has been a favored explanation for the persistence of risk alleles, my own view is that its popularity outstrips its support. One type of evidence for balancing selection would come from finding high-frequency allelesa prediction from practically every model of balancing selection-that affect mental disorder risk. Gene-mapping studies have not had much success yet matching specific alleles to severe mental disorders, however, which suggests (but does not prove) that such risk alleles are individually rare rather than common. Moreover, a recent whole-genome scan designed to detect signatures of ancient balancing selection in humans discovered no loci under balancing selection apart from those few already known to exist (Bubb et al., 2006) .
Another type of evidence consistent with the balancing-selection hypothesis would be finding that relatives of those with mental disorders have some sort of fitness advantage. This might suggest that low doses of risk alleles (typically found in relatives) have positive effects that counterbalance their high-dose negative effects. Several studies on schizophrenia have looked at this issue, and although mixed, the weight of evidence indicates that relatives of schizophrenics have equal or lower fitness than average, not higher fitness as required by balancing-selection arguments (Keller, 2008) . Nevertheless, modern reproductive success may correlate poorly with ancestral reproductive success. More intriguing support comes from studies showing that schizotypy (a personality dimension, the extreme of which may constitute schizophrenia) is higher among highly creative individuals (Nettle & Clegg, 2006) . One interpretation is that low doses of schizophrenia risk alleles increased creativity and fitness in ancestral environments. Note. Numbers of stars (0 to 3) represent the author's appraisal of strength of evidence for various lines of evidence for mutation-selection maintaining the genetic variation in schizophrenia (SZ), mental retardation (MR), bipolar disorder (BD), and autism (AU). It is unknown whether a paucity of evidence reflects null and unreported findings or little investigation. For technical reasons, it is not yet possible to directly assess the impact of point mutations, but this is not the case for deletions and duplications.
